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The 'Tulip Model' and the New Legislation
on Temporary Work in the Netherlands:
1. INTRODUCTION
On 19 April 1999 Business Week announced that 'the bloom may be off the
Tulip model', referring to the envious look of Europeans to the so-called
'Tulip model'. The jobless rate of the Netherlands has decreased over the
past years to nearly 4% while Germany and France continue to suffer with
an unemployment rate of around 11%. The reason for the Dutch success
was supposedly the fact that the Netherlands has dropped almost all
restrictions on temporary work. However, as a result of new legislation
forcing agencies to offer more job security and better benefits, measures to
attract more workers to the industry could backfire and result in higher
employment costs. Indeed, 10,000 temporary workers were due to be fired
and the growth rate of the Dutch economy was already showing signs of
slowing down, according to the Brussels reporter of the magazine'. In this
article, I will give more precise information on the new legislation and its
expected results.
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2. THE BACKGROUND OF THE 'TuLIP' OR 'POLDER' MODEL
Foundation ofLabour
Historically the so-called 'Tulip' or 'Polder' model dates back to the end of
World War II when employers' associations, labour unions and
Government decided to cooperate very closely at the national level in order
to restore the nation's economy. Thus, a private organisation of the national
employers' associations and trade unions, the Foundation ofLabour, was
established. This cooperation included a national decision-making process
on wage increases. During the 1950s wage levels were kept low in order to
rebuild the national economy and to establish a national social security
system with a high level of protection and the cooperation also promoted
low strike rates. During the 1960s this system gradually weakened as
workers asked for higher wages in line with the growth of the economy. In
the new Wage Act of 1970 the wage negotiations were almost completely
undone due to Government interference. Although a form of national
consultation, coordination and orchestration has remained until the present,
the negotiators on the branch and company level today decide freely on the
level ofwages in collective agreements.
Wassenaar Agreement
However, the unions' tradition of modest demands has still remained over
the years. The trade unions in the Netherlands have always put great
emphasis on items such as solidarity, which includes a high level of social
security and wage increases that are in line with the growth of economy in
order to protect job creation. During the 1960s the level of social security
costs gradually increased and in the 1970s automatic price compensation
for inflation was introduced as a general principle in collective agreements.
After the two oil shocks of the 1970s these factors then created a high
unemployment rate at the beginning of the 1980s3•
In 1982 in the small village of Wassenaar, near The Hague, the leaders
of the most important national trade union FNV, Wim Kok (the present
Prime-Minister), and the most important employers' association VNO,
Chris van Veen, reached a historic agreement. They agreed to end the
system of automatic compensation of inflation in the wages and,
alternatively, to start with working time reduction so as to fight
unemployment. With this agreement they prevented the Government's
3 The unemployment rate rose from 1.3% in 1971 to 6% in 1980 and 12% in 1983. After
1983 it decreased again. Source: OECD, Economic Out/ook 50, Paris 1991.
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plans to interfere in the wage negotiations using government measures. An
important aspect of the working time reductions was that this would be
implemented with flexibility: not a general reduction of working time for
everybody to, for instance, 36 hours a week, but different forms to be
chosen at branch and company level. The impact of the Wassenaar
Agreement on Dutch labour relations was important in three ways.
1. During the 1980s the reduction of working hours was achieved with a
38-hour working week as average, but in many different forms (e.g.
more free days, some days not scheduled, every 14 days one afternoon
free etc.).
2. At the same time the Government started the promotion of part-time
work. Due to the strong tradition in the Netherlands for women with
children to stay at home to take care of them, the Netherlands had
known a relatively low participation of women in the labour market.
Therefore, with women striving for emancipation the 1970s, part-time
work offered a practical compromise. Many women with children
started to work in part-time jobs, thus, the participation rate of women
increased substantially.
3. Employers also promoted the external flexibility of their workforce by
introducing more temporary contracts and employing more workers
through temporary work agencies. The labour unions gradually
softened their resistance against this development. Many job seekers
found that the ordinary State employment offices could not provide
them with work, while temporary work agencies could offer them jobs.
Although these jobs were temporary, in many cases a worker, once
introduced in a company, could stay on after the first period in a
permanent position. Besides this, the so-called 'on-call' contracts
became very popular and were accepted by the courts and, generally,
also by the trade unions.
The result is that in 1998 only 56% of the workforce in the Netherlands had
a regular full-time job, 13% had a fixed-term contract, 37% worked part-
time (75% ofwhom were women)."
4 Figures based on W. van Eeckhoute, 'Aspecten van flexibilisering', in F.J.L. Pennings
(ed.), Flexibilisering van het sociaal recht in Belgieen Nederland, Deventer, Kluwer,
1998, at p. 6.
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This last point was the reason behind the trade unions' acceptance of a
further development during the 1990s. In order to make the labour market
more flexible, several different forms of 'flexible work' became popular.
Part of this was caused by the fact that the ordinary dismissal procedure for
permanent employees was seen as complicated by employers who preferred
fixed-term contracts, but the renewal of these contracts is also restricted by
statute. Consequently, many employers prefer to work with temporary
work agencies and 'on-call' contracts, whenever possible.
In 1996 a new deal was reached by the Foundation of Labour. The
central organizations of management and labour agreed upon a report
called Flexibility and Security. This report proposed that more flexibility be
introduced in the dismissal legislation for contracts of indefmite period as
well as those of fixed-terms - meaning that temporary agencies would get
fewer restrictions and the position of the workers from temporary agencies
would be improved, especially after having worked for a longer period. The
same would apply for those workers hired on an 'on-call' basis; the general
principle being that employment relations should have flexibility from the
beginning, but should also give more job security when they last longer, no
matter the form that was eventually chosen. The Government changed the
legislation almost completely following the lines set out in the Foundation
of Labour's report and, thus, the Act on Flexibility and Security was
introduced on 1 January 1999.
The term 'Polder Model' was coined in recent years in the Netherlands
for this newly found form of cooperation between employers' organisations
and national trade unions. Based on the older tradition of close cooperation
on the national level, the organisations understood that labour relations had
to be changed in order to cope with the high unemployment and the new
demands resulting from the globalisation of industries. The 'polders? are
the pieces of land in the Netherlands that are obtained from the water -
building dikes around the land and pumping the water away achieves this.
The romantic idea is that the Dutch culture is formed in the everlasting
struggle with the water which, hence, forces the Dutch to cooperate and
accept compromises. Today, the 'Polder Model' stands for the great ability
of employers and unions to cooperate in the interest ofboth.
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3. THE CONTENT OF THE NEW LEGISLAnON
The new legislation consists of two Statutes:
The Act on Allocation of Workers by Intermediates of 1 July 1998
The Act on Flexibility and Security of 1 January 1999.
These Acts contain changes in the legislation regarding Temporary Work
Agencies (Worker dispatching services), 'on-call' contracts, fixed-term
contracts, and dismissal regulations. The position of part-time workers in
the Netherlands is legally speaking basically no different from that of full-
time workers. Since 1996 the Civil Code has prescribed the equal treatment
of part-time and full-time workers, in proportion to the amount of working
hours. The implementation of the Part-time Directive of the European
Union will not therefore be a big problem in the Netherlands',
Worker dispatching services
Since 1975 the restrictions on Worker dispatching services have been step-
by-step drastically reduced to the point of almost being abolished. In 1975
the official ban on these services was replaced by a system of licence. A
worker dispatching service needed a government permit to operate, as the
Government wanted to watch closely whether the service was following
good practices or not. It demanded that social security premiums be paid by
the agencies, that they keep a proper administration and that workers earn
wages equal to those of ordinary workers in the same company who
performed the same job. In some areas (e.g. the construction sector) these
services were abolished because of previous bad experiences with
uncontrollable 'black work'. In other branches, temporary workers were
eventually allowed to be sent for a period of three months at most. Later,
this period was prolonged to six months and, in the end, one year was
tolerated.
However, over the years this type of work became very popular in the
Netherlands. Indeed, temporary work became a form of 'employee
recruiting'. On the other hand though the legal position of temporary
workers remained uncertain. Temporary work offices for example denied
that they concluded employment contracts with their workers, but the
growth of this type of work and the desire of temporary work agencies to
have credibility gradually brought about change. During the 1980s the
5 Directive 97/81/EG of the Council of 15 December, 1997 concerning the Framework
agreement on part-time work, OfficialJoumal20 January, 1998, Ll4, p. 9-14.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OFCOMPARATNE LABOUR LAW ANDINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
424 DOCUMENTATION AND COMMENT WINTER 1999
general trade unions managed to reach a nationwide collective agreement
for temporary workers with the Organisation of Temporary Work Agencies
(ABU), and more and more courts considered that a temporary worker,
after starting to work, was working on the legal basis of an employment
contract. Finally, the Advocate-General concluded before the Hoge Raad
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands) that this was the leading legal opinion".
At this point, the ABU changed its previous position and in a 1996
Agreement with the unions" accepted the principle that temporary workers
were working on the basis of an employment contract. In exchange, the
unions accepted temporary work agencies as normal employers who, as
such, do not require specific Government supervision.
By January 1999 this agreement was formalised in the Civil Code by
the introduction of Articles 690 and 691 of Book 7 as a result of the Act on
Flexibility and Security. Article 7:690 defmes the 'dispatching work
contract' as a special type of employment contract. Its flexibility is
guaranteed by the exclusion of restrictions on dismissals of prolonged
temporary contracts during the first 26 weeks, and the possibility to agree
on a clause that terminates the contract immediately in case the hiring
company ends its assignment during this period. In the case of such a
clause, the dispatched worker is also allowed to terminate his/her work at
any time. It is possible, however, to extend these periods of 26 weeks by
collective agreement. In the New Collective Agreement for Temporary
Workers (1999-2001) this in fact was done: these exceptions are extended
to one full year and even longer. In return, the unions stipulated the right to
training and access to a pension scheme for the temporary workers when
they work longer than 26 weeks for a Workers Dispatching Agency. It is
expected that the larger temporary work offices will hire temporary
workers for longer periods in the future.
Since these offices are generally accepted today, the system of permits
was abolished on 1 July 1998, according to the new 'Act on Allocation of
Workers by Intermediates' .8
Temporary work offices are now free to operate like any other
company. Only two principles were sustained in the new Act: dispatched
workers may not be used to undermine a strike and the wage of a
dispatched worker should be the same as that of a worker who does the
6 Conclusion Advocate-General T. Koopmans 7 April 1996, Jurisprudentie Arbeids-
recht (Case-law Labor Law) 1996/168. The Hoge Raad did not give a judgment in the
case because it was withdrawn.
7 This Agreement was concluded on branch level, but connected with the nationwide
agreement on Flexibility and security.
8 Wet Allocatie van arbeidskrachten door intermediairs (Waadi), Staatsblad (Bulletin of
Acts and Orders), 1998, p. 306.
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same work as an employee of the company where the work is done.
However, the latter rule may be set aside by collective agreement (either
that of the hiring company or that of the Workers Dispatching Agency).
The Workers Dispatching Agencies are in favour of such an independent
wage policy with the argument of being employers with their own
employment policies. Sometimes they hire workers for several years and
send them to different companies in consecutive periods. Therefore, they
want to give workers with a higher seniority or a better performance a
higher salary in order to bind them to their company.
On-call contracts
Under the original type of these contracts the amount of hours and the time
when the work is to be done are not set in advance. The popularity of this
type of contract in the Netherlands is very high. Around 6% of the
workforce work under this type of contract. It is used by 16% of the
companies and they have on average 17% of their personnel employed on
this basis." There is a wide range of contracts - from a low number of hours
with a high degree of uncertainty of work to a high number of hours, for
instance 20-30 hours a week, with a high level of certainty ofemployment.
The legal position of workers working on the basis of an on-call
contract was often not strong. The more intensive the employment
relationship, the earlier it would be recognised as an employment contract
under the Dutch Civil Code. This would entitle the worker to demand
wages and access to work. Often, courts declared that since the worker had
a regular pattern of work, he/she was therefore entitled to work according
to the average of the number of hours that he/she worked during the
preceding period.
The Act on Flexibility and Security aims to strengthen the position of
these workers. In the Civil Code it introduced two so-called 'presumptions
of fact':
- Article 7:610a Civil Code determines that when a worker works three
days in every week or at least 20 hours a month for another person, it is
presumed that this is done on the basis of an employment contract.
- Article 7:61Ob Civil Code states that in case an employment contract has
lasted three months, the agreed number of hours in any month is presumed
to be the average number of hours in the three preceding months. This new
9 Figures based on 1. Plets & D. de Wolff, 'De oproepovereenkomst naar Belgisch en
Nederlands recht', in F.J.L. Pennings (00.), Flexibilisering van het sociaal recht in
Belgieen Nederland, Deventer, Kluwer, 1998, at p. 32.
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article may have important effects in cases in which the employer reduces
the number ofhours of any worker.
In both cases it is possible for the employer to prove that it was agreed
otherwise, for instance in the case of temporary overtime and seasonal
work. The employer has to prove this and this will, consequently, promote
a proper composition of contracts and more transparency in working
schedules for the worker.
The third measure is that it is more difficult for the employer to
contract away hislher obligation to pay wages in case there is no work
under hislher responsibility. This obligation may in the future only be
contracted away for the fITSt six months of a contract, unless the applicable
collective agreement allows doing so for a longer period (article 7:628
Civil Code).
The last improvement for the workers on 'on-call' contracts is the
obligation to pay at least three hours of work for any call. This obligation
rests on the employer in case of small contracts (less than 15 hours a week
and no certainty of the exact hours of work or no certainty of the amount of
hours at all). The purpose is that those workers should not be forced to sit
the whole day near the telephone waiting to be called for just one hour of
work or to travel to work just for a very short period.
Fixed-term contracts
Fixed-term contracts can be freely concluded in the Netherlands, for
whatever purpose and whatever period. In principal, their use is not legally
restricted, however up until 1999 the Civil Code stipulated that a second
consecutive fixed-term contract could not be ended without notification.
This implied the requirement of the previous permission of the Regional
Director of the Employment Service Organisation (who checks the validity
of the reason for dismissal) and the observance of a notice period. Since
these restrictions are no different from those of a contract for an indefinite
period, employers felt this legislation was very restrictive. Thus, to avoid
these restrictions in principal two ways were opened:
a. To observe a period of at least 31 days between two contracts. After
this period, the second contract was not seen as a consecutive contract.
In practice, employers often hired the same worker in the meantime for
the same job through a Worker Dispatching Agency (so-called
'revolving door construction' - draaideurconstructiey. The Hoge Raad
(Supreme Court) decided in the 1991 Campina case that when an
employer uses this arrangement for several years, a reasonable
application of the law implies that the fixed-term contract should be
considered as a consecutive fixed-term contract in the sense of the
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Civil Code'", If the worker was hired in the first instance through a
Workers Dispatching Office and then got an employment contract with
the hiring company, the time worked for the Workers Dispatching
Office was included in the calculation of the maximum probation
period of two months, as foreseen in the Civil Code" .
b. To make use of the possibility in the Civil Code to deviate from this
rule by collective agreement. Due to the high unemployment level
during the 1980s the unions often accepted exceptions to this rule in
collective agreements. In several collective agreements on branch and
company level it was therefore agreed that the duty to give notification
was only applicable after the worker had worked a certain period
(often two years) for the same employer.
Since the courts, as indicated, restricted the first possibility, the latter
option became important. As a result of the aforementioned 1996
Agreement on Flexibility and Security between the national organisations
of employers and trade unions, the Dutch Government introduced such a
legislation in the 1999 Act on Flexibility and Security. Indeed, this may be
the most important change of the new Act.
Under the present legislation (article 7:668a Civil Code), it is possible
to have 3 consecutive contracts that may be ended without having to give
notice, as long as they fall within a period of 3 years. The fourth contract,
or the contract that exceeds a period of 36 months will change
automatically into a contract for an indefinite term which gives the worker
the aforementioned protection against dismissal. Contracts that are
following each other within a period of three months are considered to be
consecutive. This change is an important form of deregulation that is
expected to make the fixed-term contract more attractive for employers.
Dismissal Regulations
The Netherlands has quite a unique system of protection against dismissals.
In principle, notice of an employment contract is not possible without the
prior permission of the Regional Director of the Labour Service
Organisation. Despite the critics from large companies, this system is still
prolonged.
The labour unions and the small enterprises are in favour of the
system. The unions because of its preventive effect: employers can only
10 Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) 22 November 1992, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Dutch
Case-Law) 1992, 707 (Bootsma a.o.lCampina).
11 Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) 13 September 1991, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Dutch
Case-Law) 1992, 130.
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dismiss a worker on the basis of reason. The small enterprises see the
system as a guarantee against lawsuits from employees for wrongful
dismissals.
In order to make the dismissal procedure faster, several measures were
taken in the Act on Flexibility and Security. These measures include
shortening of notice periods, easier access to unemployment benefits in
case of dismissals on economic grounds, and a procedure of 'no objection'
in case the worker accepts his/her dismissal and only claims an
unemployment benefit. In order to prevent abuse of rights, the ban on
dismissal of sick workers is lifted if the sickness arises after the Regional
Director of the Labour Service Organisation has received the request for
permission to dismiss.
Besides this, in practice there has been some deregulation because
many employers avoided the 'permission procedure' by asking the court
for dissolution of the employment contract (Article 7:685 Civil Code).
Although this is only possible in cases of 'severe reasons', for practical
purposes the courts accepted this as a normal dismissal procedure, which
indeed became very popular among employers and lawyers. Today, half of
the dismissal procedures are affected this way. The only disadvantage for
the employer is that the court can oblige him/her to pay the worker, which
is usually done. In 1997 the 'circle' of competent judges published a
recommendation that contained a formula to calculate these payments. The
formula is A x B x C, (seniority x monthly wage x correction factor). The
correction factor is more than 1 when the employer is responsible for the
dismissal, and less than 1 when the employee is more responsible. In
practice, this, more or less, introduces a right to a severance payment for
dismissed workers, at least when this procedure is followed.
Evaluation ofthe new legislation
The first reaction to the Act on Flexibility and Security is that it makes
dismissal regulations even more complicated than before. According to a
survey that was held in the first months after the introduction of the new
Act many employers were reluctant to work with fixed-term contracts,
although the Act aimed to promote this. In order to prevent legal problems,
employers often preferred to hire temporary personnel from temporary
work agencies, but this is typical for new legislation: it takes time to make
the possibilities clear to everybody. The real results are to be seen in the
long run. Whether the new legislation will have a backfiring effect can not
be seen in a period of only a few months. The slowing growth of the Dutch
economy that Business Week mentioned was already predicted and has
changed in the meantime.
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A second phenomenon was mentioned in the article in Business Week-
a group of workers from temporary work agencies were to get a contract
for an indefmite period on 1 July 1999 as a result of the new Collective
Agreement in this branch. The group was dismissed before this date. The
national labour union, FNV, warned in the Spring that the position of
10,000 workers would be at stake. Later, the branch organisation
announced that only 1,500 workers were fired for this reason. This group
was not supposed to be employable in the long run. Others were accepted
as permanent workers.
The general result of the new legislation seems to be that the
dispatching work agencies have a freedom to operate that is quite unique in
Europe. Only Sweden has this type of liberal system while other countries
still know many restrictions. However, this is compensated for by a
collective agreement that improves the position of the workers involved.
The Netherlands now has two systems: the still very strong position of
the Government in controlling dismissals of regular workers on the one
hand and a high amount of flexibility for other types of employment
relationships on the other.
It seems likely that in the forthcoming years the dismissal procedures
will continuously be under discussion. The Minister of Social Affairs and
Employment has already installed an Evaluation Committee on the 'Dual
System of Dismissals', which refers to the control of dismissal of regular
workers by Government or by the courts. However, the position of the
workers on flexible contracts should be monitored as well. Only in the long
run will the effects be clearly identified.
In conclusion, the 'Tulip' or 'Polder' model may serve as an example
for other countries. The present British Government is interested in flexible
labour markets under reasonable conditions for the workers as well, and the
German Government has already introduced something like the Foundation
of Labour (Bilndnis fir Arbeit). More in general though, some
Governments will look jealously to the Dutch Government because the
trade unions are willing to negotiate on long entitled rights in order to break
through a deadlock-situation with regard to unemployment. Also at the
European level the cooperation between employers organisations and trade
unions is growing, resulting in certain agreements at this level, while in
Belgium, France and some other countries the resistance to introduce more
flexibility into the labour market is still high as it is feared that it
undermines the system of labour law. More debates will no doubt be
necessary.
In the Netherlands it seems that the attention is now turning from the
so-called external flexibility (flexible contracts, dismissals) to internal
flexibility (mobility within the enterprise). More and more workers are
demanding that the company fmd a balance between working and private
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life, while companies are requesting that workers be more open to
adaptations in the work place.
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